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1. Labor market 4.0
We have been promised happiness, freedom and emancipation: things that
humans, at least in theory, aspire to. Freedom from invasive physical constraints
(which would also create emancipation) and freedom from many manual arduous
jobs that would be replaced by machines and artificial intelligence. Technological
development would facilitate mobility and speed, freeing us from having to per-
form the most strenuous and exhausting tasks. Lastly, artificial intelligence would
work hand in hand with natural intelligence, and humans would think more and
work less. The overall vision or, in any case, the positive narrative of this project,
sees technological development as a fundamental tool to achieve the net
improvement of people’s quality of life. And yet, as history shows, things didn’t
quite go as expected.
The promise of happiness offered by technological development, for instance,
was kept only to a small extent because, as often happens, things have taken an
unexpected turn. Consider wealth, for example: if it is true that new wealth has
been produced, it is equally true that its redistribution has been minimal and cer-
tainly not sufficient. Moreover, in a world that is largely globalized and extremely
sophisticated in terms of technology, complexity ends up being the element that
characterizes the social structure and dynamic in decisive ways. Culture and edu-
cation are probably the only really useful tools to effectively navigate in contexts of
this kind. Now, it’s not a bad thing if human beings must invest in their culture in
order to really be able to dominate the complexity that surrounds them. Likewise,
it’s not a bad thing if the less sophisticated jobs are gradually outsourced to
machines in societies 4.0. After all, machines do not get tired, they are subject to
less “wear and tear” than human beings, they do not protest for low wages, they
generally do not get sick and are rarely replaced. In other words, they are highly
performing and economically advantageous objects: they do not get tired, they
can work non-stop, they are not subject to irritability or mood swings and they die
differently from human beings.
In this situation two things have progressively emerged: firstly, that human
beings often resist their improvement due to their natural disposition or because
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the social condition makes this process particularly burdensome for them. Sec-
ondly, that the result of this resistance has led, in many circumstances, to a wor-
sening of social inequality, since the gap between prestigious, well-paid intellectual
jobs on the one hand and precarious, poorly paid and manual jobs on the other
hand has not only grown but has also given way to a process of progressive
desertification of the human factor. In fact, machines are gradually replacing
human beings, so those who wish to carry out work with a low intellectual content
often find it impossible to do so, as they are replaced by better performing and
more efficient machines.
And there is a second point worth considering: the serious risk of precarization
that new generations have been facing for over fifteen years now. In a highly
competitive world, in which people and things move in very short times and in
which industrial production is able to reach very high numbers, the price of the
transformation of production cycles has often been paid by workers. Apart from a
few exceptions that, not coincidentally, play the role of monopolists or semi-
monopolists in the reference market, most companies produce based on the mar-
ket’s demand. The workers, therefore, are often considered functional for the
purpose, i.e. to meet a given production threshold or the objectives set by the
market. Therefore, companies usually identify a fixed quota of people who support
production on a permanent basis and who represent the main structure of the
company, and then a variable quota that is asked to work only in case of need.
This latter quota of workers is destined either to be kept precariously in view of a
potential increase of demand, or to be dismissed when the demand drops.
The significant fact from the scientific point of view, which is very upsetting from
the point of view of social balance, is that the share of precarious workers is
becoming ever wider. This is true in both the private and the public sectors. To give
an idea of how paradoxical the situation is, it will suffice to mention a typical Italian
real-life case: it involves Federica, Alessandra, Laura and Andrea,1 who for some
time have “worked” for the National Library of Rome, the largest Italian library.
The fact that they worked for the National Library means that they were entrusted
with the tasks that are normally entrusted to a librarian. Nevertheless – i.e. despite
the fact that they were workers who performed completely normal tasks – the
institution treated them as phantom workers. In fact, they worked without being
recognized either from an economic point of view – the remuneration was not the
standard one in the sector either as regards the agreed minimum wage, or as to the
methods of payment – or from a social point of view. They were not considered
workers, but rather volunteers.
All of them, in fact, were not formally public employees, although they worked
for the public sector. In fact, they weren’t even employees – indeed, looking
closer, they weren’t even workers. As shown by the journalistic investigation that
brought media attention to the case, for more than five years Federica, Alessandra,
1 Complete data can be found in the journalistic investigation published by R. Ciccarelli
in “Il Manifesto” on 4 June 2014, entitled “How to kill a national library”.
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Laura and Andrea were paid in vouchers: they were given about €400 for a 24-hour
part-time job. Technically, therefore, they were not workers, yet they worked. They
were classified as volunteers of the “Avaca” – Association of voluntary cultural and
environmental activities, an association that looked suspiciously like a supplier of
skilled labor. The concept of hidden workers, unfortunately, appears in large number
of cases. It also applies to those young people who start a traineeship or an internship:
in this case the basic idea is that the training comes at a price and that, in some way,
the worker must pay for it. The logic is roughly the following: the worker accepts to
be paid well below average so that, in exchange, they can receive training in a given
area. Sometimes the worker even literally pays to work; more frequently, they accept
to work almost for free, because the idea is that the main remuneration lies in the
transfer of competences they learn.
These few examples give a good idea of how the forms of work have become,
over time, much more difficult to define. In other words, it has become a lot
harder to answer a whole number of questions about the nature of work and
workers, for example: who really works? And when do they do so? Can we identify
specific places assigned to work? Or, again, why do we need to define “volunteers”
people who work every day for years on end? Other questions concern the role
that institutions play in the creation, protection and reinterpretation of work: for
example, why does the state not assume the burden of protecting labour? Why,
indeed, does the state very often engage in unreported employment or employ-
ment in conditions that are detrimental to personal dignity, as in the case of the
“volunteers” for the National Library?
In this regard, despite the fact that the traditional definition of labour has
remained substantially unchanged – “a human activity aimed at the production of
goods, wealth, or in any case a product of individual or general utility” – two
seemingly strange things are happening. On the one hand, the most widespread
trend is to remunerate, in terms of money and rights, only highly qualified labor,
the kind that cannot be replaced by a machine. On the other hand, there is a
tendency to dramatically make unskilled work precarious and undignified, which is
exactly what happened to the workers of the National Library and what happens
every day to thousands of young interns.
So let’s start from here, or rather from the fact that in societies 4.0 the defini-
tion of work has not changed, and what has changed, rather, are the places, times
and knowledge related to work. As for the places of labour, it is easy to say what’s
changed: a good internet connection is now all that is needed to work and the
workplace can be anywhere. Since work is no longer rigidly bound to defined
places, working times have also become more flexible: if the place is changeable,
time is completely expandable, provided the work dynamics require it. It is now
possible to work from home with a certain ease, and in the not too distant future
it will probably be possible to transform even one’s car into a mobile and perfectly
connected workplace. This is what self-driving cars are pointing to: once driving
and transporting passengers are tasks automatically taken care of, cars will end up
becoming mobile offices, connected and perfectly equipped.
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While the twentieth century world clearly separated the places and times of
work from the places and times of private life, the century we are going through,
on the contrary, is characterized by a progressive and, apparently, irreversible
blurring of borders: working from home is presented as, and perhaps in some
respects is, an opportunity that should allow for greater flexibility. And yet it
comes with a downside. The house itself can turn into a vice-office, with working
time mixing with the time of personal life. Furthermore, for those precarious
workers available to employers on request, home can become the actual work-
place. When the boss calls, it is enough to sit in the living room and work from
there. It goes without saying that for this type of worker flexibility comes with –
among other things – a sense of isolation. Flexibility is therefore the keyword,
which truly clarifies the dynamics in progress. Places are flexible because tech-
nologies are mobile, times are flexible and are less and less linked to places,
wages are flexible because they depend directly on the amount of work secured
by the worker. So, from a conceptual point of view work remains the same type
of thing, but the truth is that, in reality, practically everything has changed. Not
for everyone, though – or at least not for everyone in the same way. For exam-
ple, things are noticeably worse for those who are about to enter the job
market – i.e. young people. And, if we fail to reverse this trend, things will be
even worse for future generations.
This situation triggers a series of problems in terms of social justice, as it is
not uncommon that the labor market presents inequality with regard to the
fundamental rights enjoyed by workers. What follows is very often a social
structure divided into two large groups: on the one hand, a labor market made
up of – often older – workers who can boast a series of rights and protections
that safeguard their professional lives; on the other hand, new generations who
are very slow to find stability and therefore enjoy no protection or rights of
any kind. In addition to being necessarily flexible, young people remain pre-
carious for a long time: in many European countries stabilization is achieved at
an increasingly advanced age. I define this phenomenon as “transgenerational
inequality”, i.e. a permanent condition of injustice between generations that
characterizes the contemporary labor market.
Transgenerational inequality in the labor market implies not only that given the
same working conditions two individuals may enjoy different rights, but also – in
most cases – that some workers (i.e. young people) undergo a significant reduc-
tion in welfare, for example in relation to the enjoyment of certain rights or of
pension coverage. To be clear, flexible jobs (in time and space) are also those that
generally entail reduced access to welfare, despite the fact that these jobs, as with all
others, contribute to the collective well-being in terms of general taxation. The thesis
that I would like to support is that the cause of this situation of transgenerational
inequality – or of an unbalanced relationship between generations for what concerns
some important questions of justice – is a deficit of transgenerationality, i.e. a general
underestimation of the crucial importance held by transgenerational links and actions
within our societies.
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2. What is transgenerationality?
Political thought has traditionally given a fundamental value to the defense of
space: as is known, in fact, the modern state was born exactly through a process of
delimiting boundaries and building national identities through separation. The
core of this process is fear, which is rightly considered one of the emotions of the
political sphere par excellence. Building a barrier that separates us from the other is
tantamount to identifying a “we” and to delimiting the space containing this “we”
so as to be able to protect it. Lastly, it means leveraging on political and social
emotions so that they may take on a positive and active aspect rather than being
purely reactional. In the Hobbesian model, the defense of the political space cul-
minates in the delegation of the right to self-defense. At the end of the state for-
mation process, Leviathan has the right and the power to defend the citizens and
the space that contains them. Moreover, it has the mission to last in time: what-
ever happens, Leviathan must last throughout the millennia to come, regardless of
any generational change. People and generations pass, Leviathan doesn’t – at most
it changes in order to last.
A commonwealth is said to be instituted when a multitude of men do agree, and
covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man or assembly of man, shall
be given by the major part the right to present the person of them all, i.e. to be their
representative; every one, as well he voted for it as he voted against it, shall authorize
all the actions and judgments of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner as
if they were his own, to the end to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be pro-
tected against other men.2
Hobbes returns several times to the idea that Leviathan is an indestructible
entity, since, ultimately, no one would have the power or the ability to decon-
struct it. The basic idea, therefore, is that the state lasts over time because, if it
didn’t, given the characteristics of human nature, there would be many reasons to
fear the return to a bellum omnium contra omnes. Western democracies have
equipped themselves with effective tools so that citizens have the opportunity to
re-examine some of the foundations and dynamics of common life; nevertheless,
the question of duration in time remains crucial, just as the concept of state (or
metastate) which underlies the possibility of an institution lasting over time.
Hobbes believed that the question of duration was linked to the sole need to
guarantee the defense of a population. In reality, in complex societies such as the
present ones the theme of durability appears to go hand in hand with the question
of justice between different generations.
Lasting means not only resisting, but also implementing types of social actions
that envisage transgenerational cooperation: in fact, if, for example, a certain gen-
eration incurs a considerable public debt for whatever reason, that debt will have
to be repaid at least in part by generations that have neither incurred nor wanted
it. In this sense, collaboration between generations is a necessary condition so that
2 Hobbes and Macpherson 1968, chp. XVIII.
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the fundamental objective – in our example, to incur a debt that allows for a given
problem to be resolved – can be reached. Without the reasonable certainty that:
(1) future generations will exist; and (2) these generations will agree to keep the
commitments made by those who preceded them, there would be no such thing
as the public debt of a state, so it would not be possible enjoy in a time x advan-
tages whose cost we know will be sustained at a time y. The collaboration or,
better, the link between different generations therefore lies in things, i.e. in the
foundations of the social structure itself.
This being the case, it is evident that there is a question of transgenerational
justice to be answered, in relation to decisions and actions that have been made by
a group of people – for example by a certain generation – but have significant
consequences on the life of different generations. States guarantee the possibility
of actions involving a considerable duration in time, since the state, contrary to
individuals, has the faculty to last for all the time necessary for a certain action to
be carried out. Therefore, it is evident that the questions of justice implicated in
this particular performativity are different from those that depend on, or are con-
nected to, the decisions or actions of an individual or of a certain group of people.
Based on what we have already said, it is therefore clear that states cannot but pay
particular attention not only to the structure of actions that have a transgenera-
tional character, but also to the related questions of justice.
Now, if lasting over time is strategic to achieve the state’s objectives, it is also
true that what is strategic in theory is not always pursued in concrete political
action. The preservation and management of power in Western democracies is an
exemplary case in this sense: a central concern in the actions of governments is in
fact the maintenance of consensus that, for the most part, comes with actions
based on short-term planning. In other words, these are actions that often aimed
at obtaining consensus from the voters and follow a short-term logic that is blind
to transgenerationality: they do not express the conviction that the correct man-
agement of transgenerational relationships and bonds should be among the prio-
rities of a government. This sounds like a real paradox because, as we mentioned
earlier, the state’s primary concern, by definition, should be to deal with the
transgenerational issue.
What emerges, therefore, is an intrinsic conflict, relative to interests and objectives,
between state and government: governments, in general, neglect and systematically
disregard the importance of the adoption of a transgenerational perspective, favoring,
on the contrary, policies aimed at generating and consolidating consensus. Instead,
from the perspective of the state, the implementation of policies attentive to
transgenerationality is vital both for the duration of the state and for the con-
solidation of social justice. On this point, therefore, governments and states
diverge. Let us try to see why, by first of all trying to understand the nature of
transgenerationality; i.e. by trying to understand what we are talking about when
we talk about transgenerationality.
So let’s try to answer the question: What is transgenerationality?. To understand
the nature of transgenerationality it can be useful to start from its opposite, i.e.
24 Tiziana Andina
T&F PROOFS NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION
Law, Labour and the Humanities; edited by Tiziano Toracca and Angela
Condello
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: B; Font: Galliard;
Dir : / / in tegrafs5/TFB/2-Paginat ion/LL_RAPS/Appl icat ionFi les /
9780367077174_text.3d;
from societies that show clear insensitivity to transgenerationality. In these socie-
ties, people and institutions have little sensitivity for issues that involve collabora-
tion between generations. In other words, these societies show little or no
attention to decisions or actions whose consequences may have wide repercussions
on the quality of life of generations to follow. Transgenerationality is therefore a
social bond based on a double recognition: the transgenerational relationship that
links parents to children (the so-called primary transgenerationality),3 but also the
bond that unites different generations that belong to the same political place
(secondary transgenerationality). However, while primary transgenerationality is a
biological constraint, secondary transgenerationality is a social constraint that
binds one generation to the other constituting the condition of possibility of the
existence of states and metastases: if there were no generational passage, every
state would have a duration limited to the life of a generation.
Instead, willy-nilly, generations do collaborate – perhaps, in most cases, it is more
correct to say that they make demands in terms of the use of economic resources,
natural and environmental resources, and trust. If this is true – and it is – then it is
necessary that the political action implemented by the states (we have seen how
governments find themselves in a situation of greater difficulty) take into account the
fact that the transgenerational constraint exists and indeed is one of the conditions
that allows states to last over time. Therefore it must be taken into account not only
when a generation makes demands from another, for example claiming rights, but
also when it has to respect the duties that come with those rights.
Let’s go back to the example of non-transgenerationality. The job market is a
rather vague entity – a bit like the art world – composed of multiple actors, whose
duties generally vary. Some seek work, some are employed, some have stopped
looking for a job, some work by helping others find a job – such as recruitment
agencies, private or public companies which continually seek workers, form them
and draw from them the human capital they need to achieve their objectives. And
many more. The transgenerational bond within the job market takes on at least
two forms: that which involves the transfer of competences from one generation
to another, and that which involves the “collaboration” between those who work
and those who are retired, i.e. those who have worked for many years and are now
living on their pension. This pension, as known, is paid for by active workers,
according to an exemplary transgenerational exchange.
In this respect, I think it’s interesting to consider an old Italian case. It was
1973. The Rumor government issued a provision that would go by the name of
“baby pensions”: the D.P.R 1092 (see, in particular, article 42).4 This provision
granted extremely generous conditions for the retirement of certain categories of
public employees: 14 years, 6 months and 1 day was the amount of working time
needed for married women with children to be able to retire. Other public
3 For a deeper analysis of the issues related to primary transgenerationality, see Schüt-
zenberger 1998.
4 For the full text, see http://www.comune.jesi.an.it/MV/leggi/dpr1092-73.htm
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employees had to have worked for 20 years, while local government employees
needed 25 years of paid contributions. The anticipated pension opportunity was
exploited by around 400,000 people, for an annual expenditure that was estimated
to be around €7.5 billion a year.
The baby pensions were repealed in 1992 by the Amato government, when
Italy risked a currency crisis that induced the government to draw up a maneuver
based on the revision of the pension system, on the introduction of a property tax
and on a general withdrawal from people’s bank accounts. The pension directive
came with heavy and protracted consequences: there were consequences in terms
of expenditure, since a considerable amount of public money was used to pay
pensions for people who were still fully productive and who could easily have
continued to work for another 25 years, contributing to the country’s wealth; and
there were consequences in terms of justice between generations, since the fol-
lowing generations, besides having to bear part of the expense to pay for the baby
pensions, were subjected to far less advantageous pension treatments, both in
economic terms and in terms of rights, for example with reference to their retire-
ment age. In other words, they had to retire much later and got much lower
pensions, so as to allow for the sustainability of the system.
The dramatic fact, from a perspective of transgenerational justice, was that the
provision had effectively contributed to putting the entire system at risk of
unsustainability. In order to continue to allow for early retirement in the long
term – i.e. to be able to grant it to future generations as well, as would have
been the case from the standpoint of equality – some factors should have jointly
occurred: the curve of residents in Italy should have remained positive, and in
addition to this, obviously, economic growth should have remained sustained.
Instead, the opposite happened: in the 1970s, the growth of the resident popu-
lation started to slow down substantially until it stopped in the 1980s (see Figure
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Figure 2.1 Growth of the resident population in Italy: 1861–2011, ISTAT data
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The statistical projection of the demographic trend up to 2065 is shown in
Figure 2.3.
In this context, the gross domestic product (GDP), as is easy to imagine, did
not fare any better: the debt/GDP ratio has been growing steadily from the 1970s
until 1994, and has then started to rise again since 2008 (see Figure 2.4).5
With regard to the trend of public expenditure in relation to social benefits and
pensions, in Figure 2.5, the lower line clearly shows a gradual decrease in employees
of the public administration, while the upper line shows a progressive increase in
expense items dedicated to social benefits and pensions since the 1980s.
Looking at these data, the situation does not appear to be very promising. In fact, by
cross-referencing the data, it can be concluded that since the 1970s the Italian debt has
progressively worsened due to high public expenditure (the pension sector being one of
the items with significant impact). This was accompanied by a significant reduction in
the birth rate, a considerable increase in the age of the population and a progressive
reduction in GDP. The question at this point is the following: could all this have been
predicted in 1973, at the time of the Rumor provision? As Hans Jonas shows,6 when we
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Figure 2.2 Growth of the resident population in Italy: 2001–2017, ISTAT data
Note: Resident population trend, ISTAT data at December 31 each year (https://www.istat.it/en/).
Source: ISTAT (http://www.programmazioneeconomica.gov.it/2018/12/20/andamenti-lungo-perio
do-economia-italiana/#Debito%20pubblico).
5 For an interesting dynamic comparison of the trends of the economies of the main
industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017, cf. the World GDP by Country,
http://digg.com/video/top-10-countries-by-gdp-1960-2017
6 Cf. Jonas 1984. Jonas addresses the question of the importance of the future for the
structuring of social models, focusing above all on the role and potential of technology.
The basic thesis, in essence, is this: since technological development has consistently
accelerated the human possibilities of intervention on nature, and since technical devel-
opment has been able to alter the deep balances of nature, humankind must take on the
task of making predictions that envision, and prevent, the most negative consequences.
For Jonas, therefore, constructing the social world means first of all taking charge of the
consequences of social decisions and actions, thereby dealing with the future.
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Proiezioni ISTAT sull’evoluzione della popolazione in Italia



























































Figure 2.3 Projection of the demographic trend up to 2065
Note: The graph shows the evolution of the total population residing in Italy on 1 January every
year, from 1960 to 2017 (Italians and foreigners), as reconstructed by ISTAT. Starting from
2018, the graph shows three of the demographic projections developed by ISTAT up to 2065:
the median is in the middle, between two projections in terms of the highest and lowest pos-




























































Figure 2.4 Italian debt/GDP ratio (1861–2015)
Source: ISTAT (http://www.programmazioneeconomica.gov.it/2018/12/20/andamenti-lungo-perio
do-economia-italiana/#Debito%20pubblico).
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decision in this regard can be seen over a very long time, the worst forecasts must be
carefully considered when making any decision. The Italian government, embodied by
Rumor and the whole Parliament, did not do so and preferred to make a choice that
would guarantee broad consensus to the governing parties. Government and Parliament
did not live up to the task of governing for the good of the state, of their fellow citizens
and especially of future citizens.
2.1. Transgenerational inequality
There are still some considerations to be made on questions of justice – in this specific
case, it would be better to say social injustice – raised by this provision. The pension
system of a country represents an important piece of the welfare system, which is
difficult to keep in balance. When establishing the age for retirement, it is mandatory
to think about the consequences of this decision in a dual sense: on the one hand, one
needs to think about the sphere of social justice, taking into account the different
types of jobs, the degree of labor they require, gender differences and so on. On the
other hand, one needs to consider the aim to pursue justice between generations: i.e.
parents and children ought to be placed in similar conditions with respect to the
rights they enjoy and the duties to which they are subject.













































20 Prestazioni sociali (pensioni e altre prestazioni sociali)
dati Istat, Eurostat e Banca d’Italia, tendenziale DEF 2018
Prestazioni sociali, pensioni e redditi da lavoro dispendente nella PA in % del PIL
Figure 2.5 Social benefits, pensions and employment income in public administration (percen-
tage of GDP)
Note:The graph shows the evolution of public expenditure on employees in the public admin-
istration and the expenditure on social benefits, where the expenditure on pensions is the
most significant component.
Source: ISTAT (http://www.programmazioneeconomica.gov.it/2018/12/20/andamenti-lungo-perio
do-economia-italiana/#Debito%20pubblico), Eurostat, Bank of Italy.
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Now, considering the Italian pension system, one can easily verify the numerous
reforms it has undergone.7 Let us briefly consider the fundamental stages of this
transformation. Social security in Italy was born in 1898 with the aim of protect-
ing workers from invalidity and old age. In 1919 the insurance for disability and
old age became mandatory for private employees. The institution of invalidity and
old-age pension was introduced, along with compulsory unemployment insurance.
Between 1927 and 1941 the Wage Supplementation Fund was introduced, to
protect the earnings of people who lost their jobs; the age limit to obtain an old-
age pension was increased to 60 for men and 55 for women; the survivor’s pen-
sion was also established. In the period from 1968 to 1972, the retributive system
based on the last salaries received replaced the contributory system. An old-age
pension and a social pension were now paid out to all citizens over the age of 65
and below a certain income threshold. In 1992 the minimum retirement age was
raised to 65 for men and women, bringing the insurance contribution to 20 years.
Starting from 1995 a series of corrections were introduced aiming to calculate
pensions based on some principles: the amount of the contributions paid during
working life, the expected duration of the pension benefit, and life expectancy.
Starting from the second half of the 1990s, the basic idea was that, while not
losing sight of the centrality of the pension system, the increase in life expectancy
should affect the ways to calculate the retirement checks. And, in fact, at least in
theory, if people do have a greater life expectancy and a better quality of life, they
can hopefully remain active in the workplace for longer. This is true at least in
general terms, with due exceptions in individual cases or in relation to certain cate-
gories of workers. However, despite this general trend, the Rumor government
allowed a whole generation to leave the workplace prematurely, setting the condi-
tions to create a situation of true generational injustice, especially to the detriment
of those citizens who not could no longer enjoy the same rights (the social com-
position in the meantime had changed significantly, as the aging of the population
meant that people enjoyed retirement checks for a longer time), but who also had
to pay for the rights of those baby-pensioners at the expense of their own.
If we assume that an individual has to work for their own and for the collective
well-being until the approach of old age, we can agree that the age limit to retire
may vary in reference to different factors, but nevertheless should not replace work
too early. This is not so much because of some vague paternalism about the idea
that humans should prefer work to idleness – indeed, in ancient societies work was
left to slaves, while the otium was considered by far the most noble activity since in
idleness it was possible to dedicate oneself to one’s formation and to cultivate lit-
eracy. Rather, more prosaically, it is because a system in which the age of the
population grows, the birthrate keeps decreasing and immigration fails to make up
for the loss of active population can only be sustainable if people work (and
therefore support themselves) for as long as possible. This guarantees that at the
7 Source: INPS, https://www.inps.it/nuovoportaleinps/default.aspx?sPathID=%3b0%
3b51646%3b&lastMenu=51646&iMenu=11&p4=2
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appropriate time, i.e. in the phase of life in which they really must be supported
through passive income, people can actually be protected. Social justice means first
of all protecting those who need it when they actually need it, implementing a
reliable system so that this is always possible, for all generations.
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